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Robert Cover’s well known article Nomos and Narrative is a passionately argued defense of
a new way of applying narrative to the philosophy and understanding of law. In my article, I
argue that there are four major problems which lie at the heart of Cover’s analysis. Each problem
addresses a major area of his overall view of law. I try to demonstrate that in each case, if the
problem is real, Cover’s view of law should be rejected. The primary difficulty is analytical and
argumentative sloppiness in Cover’s arguments. My conclusion is simple: Cover’s view of law
is both underdeveloped and theoretically unsafe. It falls victim to each of the four problems I
identify. As a result, his philosophy of law should be rejected tout court.
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Introduction 
 
The use of narrative in our thinking about the philosophy of law has been an 
exciting and fruitful development over the last couple of decades. Robert Cover’s 
well known article, Nomos and Narrative, is a passionately argued defense of a 
new way of applying narrative to the philosophy and understanding of law.1  It is, 
then, little wonder that it has attracted wide attention since its original publication 
in the Harvard Law Review in 1983.2  That said, I think there are four major 
problems which lie at the heart of Cover’s arguments in Nomos and Narrative.  In 
this article, I will simply spell out what I take to be these problems.  The primary 
difficulty is analytical and argumentative sloppiness in Cover’s arguments.  This 
article will attempt to lay bare this difficulty.  To the extent that these arguments 
fail to overcome these problems, we should then follow Cover’s arguments more 
circumspectly, if at all.  Indeed, we might even go one step further and conclude 
that Cover’s legal philosophy is unsuccessful as a theory of law.  
 
Problem One: How Do I Know a Nomos When I See One? 
 
Cover tells us that a nomos is “a normative universe” that we each inhabit.3 No 
one lies outside a nomos.  Also, Cover identifies a plurality of nomoi as existing.  
Each nomos is itself inherently meaningful and “determined by our interpretive 
commitments.”4 Cover adds that “many of our actions [can] be understood only in 
relation to a norm.”5  Thus, each nomos has for itself its own means of normative 
evaluation.  Different nomoi may reach different conclusions about the same set 
of circumstances because of different values and different means of evaluating 
these values.  It must be said from the very outset that Cover offers no arguments 
whatsoever in support of these broad assertions of fact.  He simply claims nomoi 
exist and that each nomos is identifiable by a number of characteristics.  It 
appears that his wider, implicit strategy is to convince skeptics in the end, rather 
than in the beginning.  That is, he seems to think that if we grant any number of 
boldly made assertions and if his final analysis of law is convincing, then we will 
not be troubled by the great leaps that his article starts off from.  I believe this a 
rather poor strategy to adopt.  In this section, I will challenge his views on how a 
nomos might construct reality socially. 
                                                 
1 Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 94 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
2 Id. is referenced in 957 articles on Westlaw (as of 20 August 2005).  It is also reproduced in M. 
MINOW, M. RYAN, & A. SARAT (EDS.) NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW—THE ESSAYS OF 
ROBERT COVER 95 (1992). 
3 Cover, supra note 2, at 4. 
4 Id. at 7. 
5 Id. at 7-8. 
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Each nomos is a social construction of reality, of how we understand the world.6 
This is not an uncontroversial view and, in fact, I am generally in favor of the 
view that many—although perhaps not all—meanings we attribute to the world 
are meanings we create and project onto the world.  However, Cover has a more 
specific understanding of the characteristics of a social construction of reality 
entailed by any nomos. 
 
For one thing, this social construction need not entail a state: “the creation of legal 
meaning … takes place always through an essentially cultural medium.”7  While 
it may be difficult today in light of the proliferation of states to imagine law apart 
from the state, it is certainly true that many cultures, not least many Native 
American tribes, lived within a system of laws, yet they inhabited nations, not 
states.  In addition, for Cover, the social construction of reality is precisely that: 
“collective or social.”8  
 
Cover notes that the social construction of a nomos can take one of two general 
forms.  The first is what he calls “paideic.”9 Cover says: 
 
“[Paideic] Discourse is initiatory, celebratory, expressive, and 
performative, rather than critical and analytic. Interpersonal 
commitments are characterized by reciprocal acknowledgement, 
the recognition that individuals have particular needs and strong 
obligations to render person-specific responses … a strong 
community of common obligations.”10 
 
The significance of this form of a nomos is that it is simply not a self-correcting 
normative vision.  It is self-congratulatory (i.e., celebratory) and a romantic world 
that avoids any focus on criticism, of itself or of other nomoi.  Nor is it, as Cover 
notes, “analytic.”11 
 
                                                 
6 Id. at 10. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. This point is further taken up in Richard Mullender’s article in the present symposium.  
Mullender suggests that John Searle offers something more astringent (namely, “collective 
intentionality”) than Cover’s emphasis upon emotion as a driver of communities, most especially 
paideic communities. 
9 Cover, supra note 2, at 12. 
10 Id. at 13. 
11 This is one of perhaps many instances where Cover seems to want distance between his views 
and that of analytic legal philosophy, albeit for reasons not immediately clear to me. 
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It is rather difficult to imagine any substantiation of this nomos in the world. 
Every normative community would seem to adhere to some element of self-
criticism and have some commitment to self-correction.  For example, many 
“nomoi” in early American history lived within interpretive worlds which 
accepted, if not embraced, the enslavement of African slaves and the banishment 
of Native Americans from their traditional lands.  Surely, these nomoi have 
changed and certainly for the better.  The African slave trade, and the institution 
of slave-holding, no longer exist.  The many nations of Native American tribes, 
such as the Pequot, Sioux, and Apache, now inhabit protected lands and enjoy 
more, albeit highly circumscribed, autonomy in lawmaking.  The nomoi that 
accepted enslavement and banishment were no doubt—at least amongst American 
settlers and the early colonists—“a strong community of common obligations” to 
some significant extent.12  Likewise, the nomoi in contemporary America today 
are by and large equally strong communities of common obligations.  
 
Cover’s analysis here tells us nothing about the development of nomoi.  All we 
are told is that paideic nomoi are essentially self-congratulatory and not critical. 
Yet, no nomos can be a static entity.  Our meanings change all the time.  I do not 
only mean attitudes of white settlers to slavery and Native American rights, but 
also to welfare programmes, anti-terrorism measures, international aid, 
immigration as well as asylum policies, monetary policies, and any number of 
other issues.  Do we simply reciprocally acknowledge change?  Well, if we do, 
what explains this?  How do we know “particular needs and strong obligations” 
when we see them, given that different normative communities may understand 
these things differently?  For these reasons, it appears that paideic nomoi do not 
exist anywhere in the world and may never have existed anywhere.  Cover may 
offer us examples of nomoi, but they are nomoi that exist in Cover’s heaven, 
alone, rather than on our earth.  Indeed, Cover’s claims seem empirically 
incorrect. 
 
The second general form that the social construction of a nomos can take is called 
“world maintaining” as well as “imperial.”13  Cover understands imperial forms of 
nomos creation in the following way.  He says: 
 
“[N]orms are universal and enforced by institutions. They need not 
be taught at all, as long as they are effective. Discourse is premised 
on objectivity—upon that which is external to the discourse itself. 
Interpersonal commitments are weak, premised only upon a 
minimalist obligation to refrain from the coercion and violence that 
                                                 
12 Cover, supra note 2, at 13. 
13 Id. 
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would make impossible the objective mode of discourse and the 
impartial and neutral application of norms.”14 
 
These “imperial” norms simply seem to be inculcated in individuals by the 
community.  This process is not one of everyone reading from the same little red 
book or the like, such as with Mao’s China.  Rather, individuals learn their 
community’s norms through a shared, lived experience.  Thus, imperial norms 
possess a strong communitarian character. 
 
Now if this picture is correct, it would appear that individuals would, in fact, have 
rather strong “interpersonal commitments” to one another.15 After all, if my 
personal tie to others is weak and my community’s norms “need not be taught” 
formally in the education system, but, instead, perhaps from neighbor to neighbor, 
then there seems little reason to think that this system stands any reasonable 
chance of being sustained.  Rather, it would seem that imperial norms are best 
sustained through the kinds of interpersonal commitments that Cover only grants 
to paideic forms of nomos-building: “reciprocal acknowledgement … a strong 
community of common obligations.”16  If I simply do not enjoy this particular 
form of acknowledgement and recognition from others due to “weak,” 
“interpersonal commitments,” then it is impossible to see how imperial norms are 
able to manifest and sustain themselves.17 
 
Of course, Cover does not assume that any old “weak” variety of “interpersonal 
commitments” will suffice: he notes that these norms must be “effective.”18  My 
claim here is simply that it seems quite reasonable to suppose that effective 
inculcation of imperial, “world maintaining” norms is only possible within, at 
least, a modest communitarian community where there are significant 
interpersonal relationships between community members.  Without such 
relationships, it would seem that these kinds of commitments must, in fact, be 
taught formally, contrary to what Cover claims. 
 
I have identified one problem in this section relating to Cover’s understanding of 
nomoi. The problem centers on his conception of how nomoi socially construct 
reality. The paideic view fails because it simply does not correspond to normative 
communities in the world.  In particular, it is unable to account for any change in 
a community’s norms.  The second view, the imperialist, or “world maintaining,” 
                                                 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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view, fails because it is incoherent.  If it is composed of the weak interpersonal 
commitments Cover ascribes to it, it will be unable to satisfy the characteristics 
Cover claims that it has. 
 
For these reasons, it is difficult to say how it is that I know a nomos when (or 
even if) I see one.  Neither the paideic nor the imperial picture is successful.  
What is most puzzling about this state of affairs is that even Cover seems to 
recognize a genuine problem here.  If neither paideic nor imperial social 
construction of nomoi is believed to do the things he claims, then it is strange he 
would even make a case for either.  In any event, Cover says: 
 
“Of course, no normative world has ever been created or 
maintained wholly in either the paideic or the imperial mode. I am 
not writing of types of societies, but rather isolating in discourse 
the coexisting bases for the distinct attributes of all normative 
worlds.  Any nomos must be paideic to the extent that it contains 
within it the commonalities of meaning that make continued 
normative activity possible … [Law] must both ground productive 
behavior and provide meaning for behavior that departs from the 
ordinary.”19 
 
My claim would be this: no normative world can be either paideic or imperial full 
stop. However, let us briefly look at Cover’s move above. 
 
Let us assume that it is possible for a nomos to be less than 100% paideic or 
imperial, whatever the above reservations.  We now discover that while the idea 
of a nomos is supposed to say something about normative communities that 
provide social constructions of reality, Cover does not really mean to say that 
“communities” in any proper sense are actually his subject!  If we are not talking 
about actual communities, then what does an analysis of nomoi offer legal 
philosophers? 
 
Indeed, Cover’s understanding of communities is curious.  For him,  
“communities” somehow exist in a so-called “discourse” rather than with the real 
world individuals who make them up.  It is in this discourse that we can find 
elements of paideic and imperial social construction.  Cover’s legal philosophy is 
a philosophy of law that lacks a real subject, divorced from the real life 
communities and the laws they live by.  That is, Cover offers us a legal 
philosophy that concerns itself with discursive communities instead of actual, real 
                                                 
19 Id. at 14. 
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life communities. In fact, the two may be radically distinct.  We might well 
wonder why we should make time for a philosophy of law that does not concern 
itself with actual communities (and their actual laws).  His is a peculiar view of 
law, to say the least. 
 
This characterization of Cover is one that has its roots in Richard Posner’s 
criticisms of contemporary legal philosophers.  Amongst other complaints, Posner 
is concerned—and quite rightly, in my view—with the direction of much of 
today’s work in legal philosophy.  Specifically, Posner complains that too many 
legal philosophers offer perhaps moral or even political philosophical points of 
view, often illuminating and helpful, but more commonly not about law.20 
 
In light of this worry, Cover’s view is objectionable. For one thing, if no actual 
normative community in the world can be the subject of paideic or imperial social 
construction, it is puzzling at best why Cover’s picture is an adequate approach to 
the study of law. And let us not overlook this fact.  Cover is writing for the 
Harvard Law Review about a picture of law he believes is convincing.  However, 
law is something that exists—at least in some significant sense—in the world.  It 
is uncontroversial to say “England and Wales have a legal system” or “the United 
States of America has a legal system.”  There are many ways of finding out what 
laws are upheld.  Likewise, there are many ways of identifying the several 
governmental institutions that administer so-called black letter law.  There is, of 
course, more to law than legal institutions and what is written down in judicial 
statements and legislative enactments.  For example, conventional morality and 
political institutions are also relevant to our understanding of law. 
 
In essence, my worry here is this: Cover does not seem to have the law as his 
focus. Law is something that states and many non-states enjoy.  Yet, Cover claims 
he is simply writing about something he has isolated in discourse and is not 
thinking about any particular society or even societies in general.  It is, therefore, 
his job to convince us that the discourse he has found has something useful, 
identifiable, and relevant to contribute to our understanding of actual laws.  
Unfortunately, he makes no such effort.  All we know is that he has stumbled 
across a discourse that has no obvious connection to the laws societies have.  
Hence, his claims seem to be of limited significance (at best) to our study of law. 
 
This complete absence of argument in favor of bold assertion after assertion of 
facts is again apparent in the passage above.  Recall where Cover says: “Any 
                                                 
20 See, for example,, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990), RICHARD 
A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995), and RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL 
AND LEGAL THEORY (1999). 
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nomos must be paideic to the extent that it contains within it the commonalities of 
meaning that make continued normative activity possible.”21  This claim seems to 
be an argument made in support of a paideic social construction of reality.  It is 
not an argument.  Remember Cover’s definition of a nomos: it is “a normative 
universe.”22 Each nomos is both inherently meaningful and “determined by our 
interpretive commitments.”23  Now look at the passage here.  When Cover claims 
a nomos must contain common meanings, that it must be a kind of normative 
activity, this is not a defense or even an argument in favor of paideic social 
construction.  It is a simple tautology.  Any nomos must have common meanings 
because it is a normative universe shared by a community.  Any nomos is 
meaningful because, well, that is what Cover says it is.  Finally, any nomos is a 
kind of activity because any nomos is determined by our activities: “our 
interpretive commitments.”24  Again, Cover offers assertions and here a tautology, 
instead of arguments.  This is an additional reason why I remain unconvinced by 
his understanding of how a nomos socially constructs reality, whichever path we 
may choose. 
 
Problem Two: What is the Importance of Interpersonal Recognition? 
 
A second problem is simple to state.  In essence, any nomos is possible only in 
virtue of the fact of some substantive interpersonal commitment.  This recognition 
of individuals as sharing something in common makes possible a normative 
community and the creation of its shared nomos.  What is it about this 
interpersonal recognition that is necessary for the creation of the meanings that 
make up a nomos? 
 
Again, as we have seen throughout his article, Cover provides bold assertion after 
assertion without any adequate argumentation to support his many claims.  
Nothing different happens in this case.  A nomos is a normative community.  
Normative community is made possible through a kind of interpersonal 
recognition.  Therefore, a kind of interpersonal recognition is necessary to create a 
nomos.  Recognition makes possible the creation of norms. Yet, how does 
recognition do this?  What makes recognition meaningful?  And, then, what 
makes that aspect meaningful as a manner of making recognition meaningful?  
And so on.  It is circular argument.  Recognition creates meaning and creates a 
nomos, which is a world of meaning because the nomos’s individuals share 
recognition.  In itself, this tells us absolutely nothing. 
                                                 
21 Cover, supra note 2, at 14. 
22 Id. at 4. 
23 Id. at 7. 
24 Id. 
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Cover must tell us what it is about recognition and its ability to create new 
meanings which allows it to become something important for making meanings.  
It cannot simply be important because it makes meanings and that activity itself is 
important, i.e., it is important because it is important.  This problem of explaining 
the foundation of his argument is something Cover seems to think he can avoid.  
This is a big mistake and a separate, second reason to reject his legal philosophy. 
 
Problem Three: Which Nomos is For Me? 
 
There is a further related problem: which nomos is mine?  Do I have a nomos?  
As we saw above, Cover understands a nomos to be “a normative universe” that 
each of us inhabits.25  This universe is socially constructed in either a paideic or 
an imperial way.  I have suggested a number of reasons why this view of social 
construction is unacceptable. 
 
These meanings are held by individuals, but every individual does not create his 
or her own nomos.26  Instead, a nomos is something shared by “communities 
whose members believe themselves to have common meanings for the normative 
dimensions of their common lives.”27  For example, Cover says: 
 
“[W]hichever story the [Supreme] Court chooses, alternative 
stories still provide normative bases for the growth of distinct 
constitutional worlds through the persistence of groups who find 
their respective meanings … in … radically different starting 
points.”28 
 
Thus, it is groups alone that create a nomos amongst themselves, a particular 
social construction of reality.  Again, this view of a social construction of reality 
is strictly that: a construction of reality made by a social group, in particular, a 
normative community.29 It is “the community,” not its individuals, that serves as 
“the source and sustenance of ideas about law.”30 
 
The first question here is whether or not I belong to a nomos.  I have already tried 
to prove that neither the paideic nor the imperial ways of socially constructing 
                                                 
25 Id. at 4. 
26 That said, Cover contradicts himself later. (id.at 60, 67.)  I discuss this at the end of this section. 
27 Id. at 15. See, e.g., id. at 34. 
28 Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
29 See, e.g., Id. at 10. 
30 Id. at 38. 
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reality are successful.  If I am right, then the kind of community to which I belong 
may well socially construct reality.  The problem is that it will not create a 
nomos.  Not any normative universe will do:  the only kind of normative universe 
that a nomos inhabits is one that shares in paideic and/or imperial manners of 
social construction.  If neither exists or if I am not a member of either group, let 
alone both, then I may be in a normative universe, but I am not in a nomos.  If 
either objection succeeds, then Cover’s claim that we all inhabit a nomos is false. 
 
While I believe Cover’s claim is false, let us suppose, for the purposes of 
argument, that it is true.  We might bring out the weakness of his analysis through 
reference to an example.  That is, let us grant that paideic and imperial social 
construction are possible.  Am I part of either? 
 
I am an analytic, legal philosopher. Not only can the so-called “discourse” I 
engage in be said to be “analytic,” but “critical” as well.  This kind of discourse is 
anti-paideic.  Cover claims that paideic discourse is “initiatory, celebratory, 
expressive, and performative, rather than critical and analytic.”31  My discourse is 
seemingly the opposite of paideic discourse.  This holds even if it is the case that 
my discourse, like paideic discourse, contains interpersonal commitments 
“characterized by reciprocal acknowledgement” and the like.  This is because the 
ways in which commitments take effect in each type of discourse diverge at the 
primordial level.  They are either critical and analytic or the opposite.32 My 
discourse is, thus, fundamentally at odds with paideic discourse. 
 
The situation is different with regard to imperial social construction.  If one thinks 
analytic legal philosophers are manifestly “world maintaining,” then I suppose 
such philosophers fall within the remit of a discourse.  However, I also doubt this 
to be the case.  There is no reason to think all such philosophers, least of all 
myself, premise our discourse “upon that which is external to the discourse itself” 
as opposed to internal components of the discourse, teasing out implicit 
assumptions, re-examining commonly held claims and intuitions, and the like.33 
Furthermore, imperial social construction requires norms that are “universal and 
enforced by institutions.”34  Many Anglo-American departments of law and 
philosophy are more inclined to analytic as opposed to postmodern perspectives. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, their community of mainstream legal philosophers in 
either law or philosophy departments inhabit university institutions that might 
favor analytic over postmodern legal philosophers.  
                                                 
31 Id. at 13. 
32 See, e.g., id. at 13. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 13. 
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Cover’s view here seems problematic.  For one thing, neither view of philosophy 
is static.  Analytic philosophers today are quite different from the analytic 
philosophers, particularly the Vienna Circle, of yesteryear.  Similar twists and 
turns can be found amongst postmodern philosophers.  It is, therefore, untrue that 
any particular set of “norms” is enforced by university institutions as such 
because these norms are in flux; the normative commitments of the community 
are anything other than set in stone. 
 
But someone might object to the picture I have offered on the grounds that 
“analytic philosophers” as such do not constitute any actual community.  That is, 
there is no such thing as “a nation of analytic philosophers” or a state composed 
primarily of such persons.  However, this does not defeat my objection, as Cover 
does not claim his arguments extend to any actual community.  Instead, his 
arguments extend only to a so-called “discourse” that provides some basis for 
teasing out “distinct attributes” in “normative worlds.”35  It is far from obvious 
that analytic philosophers—a group of people I perhaps interact with more than 
any other social group—do not form their own normative community, the kind 
that can possess its own nomos. 
 
Finally, I should point out that what passes for a “discourse” and its attendant 
“texts” is anything but clear.  A commonsensical understanding of, say, a single 
statute might be that this statute is itself a single text.  It may be read and 
interpreted differently, of course, but it is one physical, actual thing, nevertheless: 
a single, particular text.  Not so, on Cover’s account.  In his view, we have as 
many different “texts” of this single statute as there are different interpretations.36  
But then why claim that there is a multiplicity of “texts” of any single document?  
It is surely more clear (and precise) to claim instead that every single written 
document may be interpreted differently.  Full stop.  Period.  Not only is there 
nothing suspicious about this claim—it is surely a truism—but it is direct and to 
the point, a virtue I fear Cover avoids intentionally.  In speaking of “texts” rather 
than simply the “interpretations of texts” (which is precisely what he means to 
say), Cover tries to move us away from the view of law as a particular collection 
of letters, words, punctuation, and the like, and towards a view which holds that 
law itself is perhaps sometimes nowhere to be found, buried underneath an 
avalanche of competing “texts.”  This is obscurantist nonsense. 
 
                                                 
35 Id. at 14. 
36 See, e.g., id. at 4n4: “Every version of the framing of the Constitution creates a ‘new’ text.” In 
addition, Cover also talks about mainstream legal texts as “texts of jurisdiction” and opposing 
interpretations as “texts of resistance.” (id. at 54.) 
10 Symposium: Robert M. Cover's Nomos and Narrative [2006], Article 5
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss8/art5
Thus far, I have argued that I may not, in fact, inhabit any nomos at all, contrary 
to everything Cover argues.  Now let me provide another set of reasons for 
thinking that this is the case.  As I have stated above, for Cover, groups create a 
nomos.  Each individual does not create her own nomos particular to herself.  
Each group, therefore, shares in a particular normative world, a world with a 
particular set of interpersonal commitments and the like.  Such a view is not 
entirely unlike that of many theorists, not least Rousseau, Hegel, Dworkin, and 
others, who adhere to the position that law gives expression to a general will 
(volonté générale).37 
 
The problem with this conception of any group’s particular view—as opposed to 
the position that only the individuals who compose a community, rather than the 
community itself, can possess such views—is captured well in Stephanie Lewis’s 
criticism of Ronald Dworkin’s legal philosophy. Lewis argues: 
 
“Dworkin is not in the business to exhibit the beliefs that people do 
in fact hold. He is doing jurisprudence, not moral anthropology.  
But it is important to realise that the truth of the rights thesis 
depends on the truth of these empirical claims.  It relies on moral 
uniformity, in particular on uniform liberal democratic beliefs. The 
discovery that people do not in fact have these uniform background 
beliefs would pre-empt the rights thesis, and bankrupt Dworkin’s 
theory of adjudication.”38 
 
It is true, as Dworkin is quick to note, that “[m]oral diversity is sometimes 
exaggerated” and that there is a “degree of convergence over basic moral matters 
throughout history … both striking and predictable.”39  Nevertheless, moral 
pluralism poses a significant challenge to both Dworkin’s and Cover’s legal 
                                                 
37 See Ronald Dworkin, Constitutionalism and Democracy, 3 EUR. J. PHIL. 2 (1995); RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1998) AT 168, 189; G. W. F. HEGEL, POLITICAL WRITINGS (1999) at 
2, 5; G. W. F. HEGEL, GRUNDLIENIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS, VOL. 7 (1970) at §§215 
Addition, 228 Remark; Richard Nordahl, Rousseau in Dworkin: Judicial Rulings as Expressions 
of the General Will, 3 Legal Theory 317 (1997); Arthur Ripstein, Universal and General Wills: 
Hegel and Rousseau, 22 POL. TH. 444 (1994); and JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS (1997) at 57. 
38 Stephanie Lewis, Adjudication and Fairness, 61 AUSTRAL. J. PHIL. 160, 163 (1983). See Chin 
Liew Ten, Moral Rights and Duties in Wicked Legal Systems, 1 UTILITAS 135 (1989). 
39 Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 113 
(1996). 
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philosophies (although I will discuss only the challenge to Cover’s thought 
here).40 
 
Cover’s view (which is not, I think, unlike Dworkin’s view) entails that a 
community speaks with a particular voice, that it shares a single, coherent vision.  
It is, after all, “the community” (and not its individual members) that serves “as 
the source and sustenance of ideas about law.”41  Is this view accurate? 
 
Now, it is true that Cover admits that there might be “some interpretive 
divergence” within a normative community.42  Therefore, communities do not 
speak with one voice only, but one voice for the most part.  In addition, a political 
community may contain several competing normative communities.43  Cover’s 
point is not that a political community, such as the United States of America, 
speaks with a single and unified voice, by and large.  Instead, his point is that 
within the United States there are normative communities.  These smaller 
communities can be said to speak with a single voice, albeit each community may 
have the odd voice of dissent. 
 
One immediate worry is raised by Joseph Raz.  He claims quite rightly that not all 
legal systems recognize conventional morality as a source of positive law.44  If 
this is true, then conventional norms may be shared by a community as Cover 
argues, but it amounts to nothing as a theory of law.  Thus, Cover’s view will be 
irrelevant from the standpoint of law even if his view of a nomos is correct. 
 
A second worry relates to the strength of recognition amongst a community’s 
members.  For Cover, there must be interpersonal commitments at least strong 
enough to sustain a particular community’s nomos.45  If a society is largely 
libertarian and lacks such commitments, then Cover’s analysis is unhelpful as a 
theory of law in that context even if his view of a nomos is correct. 
 
There are, thus, two worries which demonstrate that even if Cover is correct about 
what can serve as a nomos, he fails to give us a successful new theory of law.  
And there is reason to think these worries are real.  First, a legal system can only 
                                                 
40 For criticisms of Dworkin’s alleged moral monism, see Joseph Raz, Speaking With One Voice: 
On Dworkinian Integrity and Coherence, in JUSTINE BURLEY (ED.), DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS 
WITH REPLIES BY DWORKIN 285 (2004). 
41 Cover, supra note 2, at 38. 
42 Id. at 40. 
43 Id. at 43. 
44 See Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, in MARSHALL COHEN (ED.), RONALD 
DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 80 (1984). 
45 See, e.g., Cover, supra note 2, at 13. 
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recognize conventional morality as a source of positive law when such 
conventions exist.  At all points in the formation of American law was there a 
shared “conventional morality”? I doubt it.  Indeed, many laws are not generated 
by a moral view, but practical necessity instead.  Traffic laws exemplify this 
point.  What is “immoral” about driving on the wrong side of the road, driving in 
the wrong direction on a one way street, or failing to stop at a red light?  It may 
not be the fact that the driver has breached conventions that existed before the 
traffic lights were erected.  This being so,  an adequate theory of law must be able 
to move beyond shared commitments.  Cover’s theory fails to do this.  The theory 
fails as a result. 
 
Second, many communities in the world may well lack the stronger variety of 
interpersonal commitments that Cover’s theory requires.  These communities and 
their laws sit outside the realm Cover’s theory seems to go some way towards 
explaining.  It is, therefore, not a universal theory and it is uncertain which 
communities and their associated laws it is applicable to, even if it is theoretically 
sound, something I have attacked for much of this article. 
 
There is, however, a third worry and it relates to the soundness of this particular 
area of Cover’s theory.  For most of his article, a nomos is created by a normative 
community, a community composed of individuals who share in a substantial 
degree of interpersonal recognition.  Yet, Cover is anything but consistent even on 
this point. Indeed, he suggests that individuals can create a nomos for 
themselves.46  On this subject, he says: “Judges are like the rest of us.  They 
interpret and they make law.”47  Moreover, on Cover’s account, judges are no 
better than the rest of us at creating normative worlds.  Rather, they are simply 
“like the rest of us.”48  You and I, as well as judges, can interpret and create laws 
for ourselves.  And, this being so, every person can fashion and inhabit a unique 
nomos. 
 
Cover’s position here gives rise to a number of difficulties.  For one thing, it is 
outright false to say that I—a philosophy lecturer—can, in the same way as a 
professional judge, make laws.  My opinions on legal cases may well be 
published in academic journals and books, appear on Westlaw, and the like.  
However, my opinions cannot (unlike those of a judge) become precedents.  I do 
not know what motivates Cover to make this straightforwardly false claim. 
 
                                                 
46 Cover says: “The meaning judges thus give to law, however, is not privileged, not necessarily 
worth any more than that of the resister they put in jail.” (id. At 60.) 
47 Id. at 67.   
48 Id. 
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Nevertheless, if I can create law like a judge, it is something that I am able to do. 
In this example, Cover does not reference the community: the judge is a person 
who undoubtedly is said to inhabit a nomos, but the judge decides for himself the 
merits of the case and what the law requires.  The interpersonal recognition he 
receives does not appear to do any work, at least as Cover explains the matter in 
the relevant passages of his essay.  This flatly contradicts about everything he has 
said thus far on how law and its meaning is created and maintained.  The two 
views are incompatible and, thus, Cover’s analysis is, at the very least, 
theoretically unsound. 
 
Problem Four: How Do We Choose Between Competing Interpretations? 
 
For Cover, the meaning of law is “essentially contested,” a simple truism.49  
However, this contestation is thought to be “uncontrolled” in character.50  By this, 
he seems to mean nothing more than the fact that no single interpretation of law 
and its meaning has priority over other interpretations.  For example, Cover says: 
 
“I am asserting that within the domain of constitutional meaning, 
the understanding of the Mennonites assumes a status equal (or 
superior) to that accorded to the understanding of the Justices of 
the Supreme Court.  In this realm of meaning—if not in the 
domain of social control—the Mennonite community creates law 
as fully as does the judge.”51 
 
The judge’s interpretation of law is equal (and perhaps inferior) to the 
interpretation of law offered by the small normative community of Mennonites.  
Cover calls us statists if we privilege the judge’s interpretation above that of the 
Mennonites.52  In addition, Cover says: 
 
“[T]he statist position may be understood to assert implicitly, not a 
superior interpretive method, but a convention of legal discourse: 
the state and its designated hierarchy are entitled to the exclusive 
or supreme jurisgenerative capacity … The position that only the 
state creates law thus confuses the status of interpretation with the 
status of political domination.”53 
 
                                                 
49 Id. at 17. 
50 Id. at 18. 
51 Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 
52 Id. at 29. See, e.g., id. at 60. 
53 Id. at 42-43. 
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Cover’s view that any and all legal interpretations of non-judges are equal with 
those of judges seems straightforwardly false to me.  For one thing, the 
Mennonites and other normative communities may well lack the legal training 
and experience that a professional judge has attained.  While judges may well get 
decisions wrong, there seems every reason to think that, on average, they do much 
better than those who lack such training or experience.  If this were not so, I 
would expect Cover to argue next that we should close all the law schools.  After 
all, what do they teach of any value if the education provided does not equip those 
who receive it to interpret the law any better than the man on the street who never 
has a day of legal education in his life?  Moreover, I find use of the epithet 
“statist” for those who might side (all things considered) with a judge’s opinion 
rather than that of an untrained member of the public rather disturbing—and I say 
this as one known to be a vociferous proponent of the jury trial.54  In this section, 
I will try to demonstrate that Cover’s view is false. 
 
Let us imagine that England and Wales has at least two nomoi.  The first nomos is 
composed of the vast majority of citizens who use English in their everyday lives.  
This nomos is dominant numerically and politically: its normative commitments 
are enshrined in the laws of England and Wales, written in English. 
 
The second nomos is a group of persons previously unknown.  They share 
everything in common with the first nomos except their size (they are a small 
minority) and their normative commitments (they are a distinctly different 
nomos).  There is also one additional respect in which they differ.  The second 
nomos speak and write in Aenglish: it reads and sounds like perfect English to 
someone fluent in English.  However, its meaning is radically different for those 
fluent in Aenglish.  This is because the same words have radically different 
meanings in each of the languages. 
 
Now suppose that these two normative communities dispute the meaning of an 
English and Welsh law.  For English speakers, the law’s common interpretation is 
that murder is prohibited.  A member of the Aenglish community transgresses this 
law, is tried by the Crown Court, and is given a life sentence.  The Aenglish 
individual’s solicitor attempts to appeal the conviction on the grounds that, to the 
Aenglish community, English and Welsh law does not prohibit murder as the 
Aenglish community read it (recall they read the laws in Aenglish, not English). 
English and Welsh law does prohibit murder as the English speakers read it.  
                                                 
54 For example, see Thom Brooks, The Right to Trial By Jury, 21 J. APP. PHIL. 197 (2004); Thom 
Brooks, A Defence of Jury Nullification, 10 RES PUBLICA 401 (2004); and Thom Brooks, On Jury 
Nullification, 97 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 169 (2005). 
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Should the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords find in their favour if the case 
is appealed? 
 
I use this example in an attempt to make explicit everything that is incorrect about 
Cover’s view.  Here the English and the Aenglish have competing interpretations 
of law. In fact, they are diametrically opposed.  What reason do we have to think 
that the majority nomos composing the vast majority of England and Wales, and 
enshrined in English and Welsh law, should do “violence” to this poor Aenglish 
soul, someone who has the misfortune to traipse around in a different, competing 
nomos? 
 
The answer is simple.  The Aenglish individual should be imprisoned because he 
broke the law prohibiting murder.  It does not matter that he speaks a different 
language or has a different value system.  To accept the contrary view would be to 
accept that we should not apprehend and punish a serial arsonist on the grounds 
that she is a part of a particular modern witch community or is newly arrived from 
a different country where it is customary to set fire to the property of others.  
Would Cover claim this?  Well, he certainly associates “the ultimately true 
interpretation of law” with everyday adjudication.  Moreover, let us remind 
ourselves of a passage quoted earlier.  Cover says: 
 
“[T]he statist position may be understood to assert implicitly, not a 
superior interpretive method, but a convention of legal discourse: 
the state and its designated hierarchy are entitled to the exclusive 
or supreme jurisgenerative capacity … The position that only the 
state creates law thus confuses the status of interpretation with the 
status of political domination.”55 
 
Cover may well be right to suggest that in two thousand years’ time we may all 
come to a new and improved understanding of the First Amendment or The 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 than we have at present.  In addition, it may 
well be the case that some professors may well make better judges in particular 
cases than the judges who sit in court today.  This is a strictly epistemological 
claim about knowing how to choose best between competing interpretations—and 
it contains a number of ifs, ands, buts, and the odd however as to how we might 
perform this task.  Nevertheless, many of us working in legal philosophy today 
may agree that some super-duper, true-for-all-time interpretation of any aspect of 
law is impossible to know when you have stumbled upon it; or it is very possible 
                                                 
55 Cover, supra note 2, at 42-43. 
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a non-judge will have a better argument for a decision contrary to what the courts 
have done and yet continue to remain far from persuaded by Cover’s claims. 
 
Cover’s analysis does not tell us what we should do when we must decide cases. 
He seems to suggest the view that we should simply “let the best narrative win,” 
but even this does not work and is unsuccessful.  As we have seen, each nomos 
has its own set of values.  Cover tells us that the merits and demerits of various 
plans of action are all determined by what the normative values are within our 
nomos.  Each nomos has different rules for assessing the same set of 
circumstances.  If each nomos has different rules, then the judgments of different 
nomoi may well not overlap.  No one can say whether one narrative is more 
correct than another.  If you have a legal dispute, all you can hope for is that both 
parties belong to the same nomos—and even this may not work, as in some cases 
Cover claims that individuals can make their own nomos for themselves as well. 
 
And what is so bad about being a statist?  After all, Cover is supposed to be 
saying something about law.  Law is something defined and administered largely 
by states, although not in every instance.  It is true that states sometimes get the 
law wrong. But a good argument in a dissenting opinion remains part of the legal 
record.  It does not disappear.  All is not lost.  Seemingly, only statists have a 
theory about conflict resolution that is practical and sustainable, whatever its 
many defects.  Here, Cover’s view does not get off the ground.  This is because it 
has yet to land on earth.  
 
A final point is worth raising.  Interpretations can be wrong.  Imagine a student in 
a class on Plato’s Republic arguing that Plato was a vociferous advocate of 
democracy.56 When advised that this view is false because Plato is rather explicit 
about his preference for philosopher-kings and his disdain for democracy, the 
student replies: “Well, Dr. Brooks, that is only your interpretation—and here your 
view is different from my interpretation.  Please don’t privilege your view above 
mine: after all, that would be academist!”  Such a claim would never be treated 
seriously by any intellectual, let alone any decent Plato scholar.  Yet, it is the kind 
of claim Cover seems to ask us to entertain. This is an absurd view to defend. 
 
                                                 
56 See PLATO, REPUBLIC (1992) at Book VIII; Thom Brooks, Knowledge and Power in Plato’s 
Political Thought, INT. J. PHIL. STUD. (forthcoming); and Thom Brooks, Plato, Hegel, and 
Democracy, BULL. HEGEL SOC. GREAT BRITAIN (forthcoming). 
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Conclusion  
 
Robert Cover ends Nomos and Narrative with this statement: “We ought to stop 
circumscribing the nomos; we ought to invite new worlds.”57 In essence, his cry is 
“let a thousand nomoi bloom!”  I have raised four problems with respect to 
Nomos and Narrative.  Any one of these problems raises serious concerns about 
the value of Cover’s analysis.  We should, therefore, look beyond Nomos and 
Narrative for a more plausible account of law. 
 
                                                 
57 Cover, supra note 2, at 68. 
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